This paper concerns what I take to be the primary epistemological motivation for defending moral perception.
some behavior, rather than perceiving that something instantiates the property of behaving in some particular way, or that Vera perceives a bus, rather than that she perceives that something instantiates the property of being a bus. This should not be taken as a leap to assuming that we can perceive objects independently of their properties (though I do not deny this, either.) 6 For defense-as well as arguments that this claim is compatible with views it is typically taken to be in tension with, such as naïve realism-see Siegel (2011, chap. 2). 7 What is the difference between perception of X and experience as of X? First, I take it perceptions of X need to have a certain kind of "cognitive basicness." Presumably, both optimists and skeptics about mental state perception would grant that there can be experiences as of anger. Their disagreement would be over whether such experiences ground or are grounded in judgements about anger. Second, for the optimist, a perception of anger is at an intermediate "cognitive level" between an experience as of anger and an anger-judgement. This allows for the possibility of having an experience as of X without perceiving X-say, if I know I'm in a context where there are likely to be a lot of fake Xs. This bit about "cognitive level" is intentionally left vague.
It serves only to make certain points more intuitive (I hope); nothing substantive is meant to hang on it.
Faraci 3 when she sees Clark Kent. Given that my interest is epistemological, I will be using "perception of X" exclusively in the latter, intensional sense. As I'm using it, "perception of X" is also not a success term-one can have a false perception of X.
When I speak of X-like experiences or experiences as of X, I mean experiences with distinctively X-like phenomenal content. Where X is in some class C, I will sometimes talk about C perceptions or experiences-e.g., being wrong is a moral property, so a perception of wrongness is a moral perception, and an experience as of wrongness is a moral experience.
I will not offer a full theory of what it is for phenomenal content to be X-like. Roughly, the idea is that the phenomenal content of an X-like experience bears an important kind of similarity relation to certain recognizable features of X. 8 For example, the phenomenal content of a square-like experience-an experience as of a square-bears certain structural similarities to key recognizable features of actual squares. Arguably, an experience as of a square has the same phenomenal content as a particular kind of experience as of a rectangle-i.e., one where the rectangle seems to be equilateral. I take it that someone who lacks the concept 'rectangle' might have an experience as of a square without having an experience as of a rectangle. Thus, "experience as of X" is also intensional.
Begin with a simple case. Norm and Vera are driving through the country. A bus cuts them off, and Vera becomes irate. Norm sees that she is angry, and tries to comfort her.
Some will accept that Norm really does perceive that Vera is angry. Perhaps before Norm knew Vera as well as he does now, the phenomenology of seeing her reaction would have been different from how it is now. The best explanation for this "phenomenal contrast" might be that 8 Which features? Answering this question is difficult. For instance, it can't just be those features that explain the experience. For, intuitively, it seems that a quotidian experience of water is water-like, but not H20-like.
For the same reason, it can't be those features that we associate with the object of experience-at least not given that some people know that water is H20. I suspect the answer has something to do with the features that allow the experiences to meet criteria set by our concepts, but I won't explore this further here.
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Norm is now perceiving her anger. 9 Others will deny this. They might hold, instead, that Norm perceives only that Vera is scowling, judging that she is angry on the basis of that perception.
10
Suppose a skeptic about mental state perception is trying to account for Norm's knowledge that Vera is angry. On the skeptical view just described, there is an important epistemological relationship between Norm's judgement that Vera is angry and his perception of her scowl. Norm infers (or in some other way "shifts"
11
) from perception of that scowl to a judgement about her mental state. For this inference to have epistemic merit, Norm must possess some background knowledge about connections between Vera's facial expressions and her mental states.
12
Crucially, the epistemological story for optimists about mental state perception is unlikely to differ much from the skeptic's. Assuming Norm isn't telepathic, his perception of Vera's mental state is clearly grounded in his experience of her behavior: He perceives anger because he has an experience as of a scowl. For this relation to have epistemic merit, Norm must again possess some background knowledge of a relation between scowls and anger.
13 9 This argument mimics the phenomenal contrast arguments Siegel (2011) deploys to defend perception of various complex properties. Werner (forthcoming) deploys such an argument to defend moral perception.
Werner's argument comes up again in §2.3.
10 I'm assuming here that Norm might judge Vera to be angry partly on the basis of her behavior. This is roughly in line with the "theory theory" about judgements concerning others' mental states. In contrast, according to "simulation theory," Norm might judge that Vera is angry after running through empathetic processing starting with the same input (the bus cutting them off). I set simulation theory aside because it doesn't seem compatible with mental state perception, which I'm focusing on for illustrative purposes. (For one thing, Vera's mental state plays no role in the simulation theoretic explanation of Norm's judgement.)
For an overview of simulation theory as a reaction to the theory theory, see Gordon (2009).
11 I take no position here on whether sub-personal processing can count as inferential.
12 Or, at least, beliefs that themselves have some epistemic merit (e.g., are justified).
13 To be clear, I'm not claiming that it's psychologically impossible to have an experience as of anger in the absence of behavioral cues, only that, barring telepathy, such experiences couldn't produce knowledge.
Perhaps this can be resisted-e.g., by externalists or coherentists. I can't fully address this here, though I'll [S]uppose Alice believes that homosexuality is wrong, and that she believes this because she has learned that the scriptures say that homosexuality is wrong, and believes that the scriptures are authoritative on this matter. But then she gets to know a couple, Bob and Chuck, who live next door. She gradually comes to believe that it is not wrong for them to be in this relationship. It isn't that she comes to believe this because she detects some non-moral features that she believes are sufficient for having a morally permissible relationship-she doesn't change her mind because she learns that these people are monogamous, or that they prioritize each other's needs. According to the moral principles that Alice believes, these sorts of non-moral facts would be insufficient for having a relationship that is morally permissible. Alice simply comes to believe that there is nothing wrong with this relationship, on the basis of her acquaintance with Bob and Chuck. (McGrath 2004, 224-225) McGrath denies that Alice perceives the permissibility of Bob and Chuck's relationship "because she detects some non-moral features that she believes are sufficient for having a morally permissible C1. Therefore, in epistemically successful cases, and barring telepathy, perceptions of others' mental states are mediated by background knowledge of some relation between certain behavioral cues and the relevant mental states.
P3. Norm's perception of Vera's anger is a perception of another's mental state.
C2. Therefore, barring telepathy, Norm's perception of Vera's anger is epistemically successful only if it is mediated by relevant background knowledge-presumably, that her behavior suggests she is angry.
If we are to grant McGrath that Alice's case, as described, is possible, something must block an analogous line of reasoning with respect to moral perception. In §2. This illuminates a path of resistance for the optimist about epistemically successful unmediated moral perception (from here I frequently drop the "epistemically successful" qualifier). In §2.3, I
offer some reasons to think that path is closed.
An Argument that Moral Perception is Grounded in Non-Moral Experience
Suppose Norm accepts the above argument, but claims that he is telepathic, and thus that his mental state perceptions are not grounded in behavioral experiences. Here's one way we might test his claim: Construct a counterfactual scenario much like the one discussed in §1, but make the minimal changes necessary to remove the anger: Norm and Vera are driving along, a bus cuts them off, Vera scowls, shouts, etc., and Norm sees this. But it's all a setup: Vera knew the bus was going to be there, and is behaving just as she would were she actually angry (she's a very good actor) so as to test
Norm's claim that he is telepathic. If Norm perceives anger just as he did in the original case, this suggests that his perception of anger is explained by his experience of her behavior.
Nick Sturgeon deploys a similar counterfactual test in a famous exchange with Gil Harman, on the topic of moral explanations of moral judgements. 19 Harman offers a case in which someone comes upon a group of children torturing a cat for fun. The onlooker-call him Sam-perceives that the children are doing something wrong. Harman argues that Sam's moral perception can be fully explained by Sam's non-moral experience in combination with his background moral beliefs, and thus the wrongness itself does no explanatory work.
Sturgeon rebuts with a counterfactual test: He introduces a counterfactual scenario that differs from the original to the minimal extent necessary to remove the wrongness, then asks 19 The exchange begins with Harman (1977) . Sturgeon responds in his (1986) . This went back-and-forth a bit; next is Harman (1986 It is not hard to see why we might be suspicious of this result. I characterized the test in terms of constructing counterfactual scenarios that differ "to the minimal extent necessary to remove the wrongness." Unfortunately, moral supervenience entails that "the minimal extent necessary" requires altering the base properties along with the moral ones. And so it is possible that it is the change in those base properties, rather than the change in the moral properties themselvesi.e., the fact that the cat is now being pet rather than tortured-that explains the change in Sam's experience. 20 What we may well have discovered, then, is not that Sam passes an important test, but rather that because moral properties supervene, the test can't function properly in moral cases.
21
Luckily, we can do better. For our concern isn't whether moral properties explain moral perceptions, but rather whether moral perceptions are grounded in non-moral experiences. Thus, our question in this case is not whether wrongness itself explains Sam's moral perception, but whether
Sam's experience as of certain non-moral features of cat-torture grounds that perception.
To see why the counterfactual test is still useful, return briefly to Norm. The fact that Norm continues to see Vera as angry in the counterfactual case strongly suggests that her behaviors explain his perception of anger. This suggest the principle:
Explanation If perceptions of X track the presence of Y even in the absence of X, the best explanation is that the presence of Y explains perceptions of X.
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Explanation doesn't seem to cut much ice in the moral case when we substitute some base property for Y, because it isn't possible for Y to be present while X (the moral property) is absent. Crucially, none of this relies on the details of the particular cases under consideration.
Something similar seems true about every case involving every moral property. Schematically, take any epistemically successful case in which person P perceives some moral property M in the presence of some set of non-moral properties N. I submit that in every case, were we to remove M, convincingly fake some subset of N, and change nothing else, P would falsely perceive M. If we can indeed expect this in every case, we should conclude that all epistemically successful moral perception is grounded in non-moral experience.
25
We now have the makings of an argument that all epistemically successful moral perception is mediated:
P1.
[Mediation] If perceptions of X are grounded in experiences as of Y, then perceptions of X produce knowledge only if they are mediated by background knowledge of some relation between X and Y.
indistinguishable to Sam. The counterfactual test thus suggests that Sam's moral perception tracks experiences that are indistinguishable from experiences as of cat-torture better than they track the presence of wrongness.
The best explanation for this seems to be that his falsidical moral perception is grounded in a non-moral experience that is indistinguishable from an experience as of cat-torture. And the best explanation for this seems to be that his veridical moral perception is grounded in his experience as of cat-torture. For simplicity's sake, I
will continue to speak as though the two have the same phenomenal contents. For those who reject this, "experience as of cat-torture" can be taken to refer both to cat-torture-like experiences and those that are indistinguishable from cat-torture-like experiences. This makes no substantive difference to my arguments. 25 The idea that this concerns every case is crucial. suggested. I thus set the possibility of rejecting these results aside. This leaves the option of proposing a competing explanation for the results of the counterfactual test. In §2.2, I consider one such explanation and revise the argument to accommodate it. In §2.3, I offer reasons for thinking the argument is sound, even so altered.
An Objection to and Revision of the Above Argument
Return to Norm and Vera, but this time, focus on Vera's perception of the bus. Vera's perception of the bus is presumably grounded in an experience as of a bus. According to Mediation, it follows that Vera's perception of the bus (assuming it is epistemically successful) must be mediated by Faraci 13 background knowledge of a relation between the bus and itself. We could accept this, but it seems rather odd. First, it might seem that if there are any cases of unmediated perception, Vera's will be one. Certainly, her perception seems more "direct" than Norm's, Sam's or Alice's. So perhaps we should revise Mediation to exclude cases where X and Y are identical, as follows: Cliff2, on the other hand, experiences that stuff as most of us would-as colorless, wet, etc. Insofar as Cliff2 perceives H20, it seems clear that his perception is grounded in his experience as of water (and thus mediated by background knowledge that water is H20). This is true even assuming being water and being H20 are the same property.
Mediation
The counterfactual test can help us determine which case we are dealing with. Suppose Cliff claims to be Cliff1, able to directly see molecular structure. Dubious, we head over to Twin Earth and get ourselves some XYZ. Given its causal properties, we can safely assume that XYZ will produce in Cliff an experience as of water-unless he has Cliff1's "molecular sight." 
Some Reasons to Think Moral and Non-Moral Experiences Have Different Phenomenal Contents
I have suggested that the optimist about unmediated moral perception might argue that some moral and non-moral experiences have the same phenomenal content. If so, we should expect and be untroubled by the fact that epistemically successful moral perceptions track certain non-moral experiences. Crucially, though, we should also expect that some epistemically successful non-moral 29 This is not to say, of course, that there are no puzzles about how experiences as of X generate knowledge about X, given the possibility of illusions, only that these puzzles would pose no special problem for moral perception.
Faraci 17 perceptions will track certain moral experiences. For example, suppose all and only pleasure is good, and that experiences as of goodness and experiences as of pleasure have the same phenomenal content.
Suppose unmediated perceptions of goodness are grounded in, and therefore track, experiences as of goodness. Barring exceptional cases, we should thus expect that perceptions of goodness will also track experiences as of pleasure. But this goes both ways. So we should also expect that, barring exceptional cases, perceptions of pleasure will track experiences as of goodness. This suggests that people would rarely, if ever, perceive pleasure without having an experience as of goodness. [wrong], whereas Pathos's does not." If Werner is right, then it seems perfectly possible for someone 30 Barring this sort of monism, the situation will be more complicated. For example, suppose causing suffering is wrong, but many other things are, too. In that case, there will be, at best, a partial overlap between experiences as of suffering and experiences as of wrongness. This won't change the basic issues, though, just make them more complicated. 31 The inner quotation concerning what it is to lack "affective empathy" comes from Blair (2007, 4) . Nevertheless, she might still accept the Moorean intuition that, conceptually, being suffering isn't actually sufficient for being wrong. I'm not sure how psychologically plausible this is. But even if it is, it provides a rather hollow victory for the optimist about unmediated moral perception. For in order to develop a purely perceptual moral epistemology, we need to account for the knowledge of whoever pointed those wrong things out to her. Suppose we trace this back to the origin of the concept. Moorean intuitions seem to block the idea that this origin could itself be ostensive. This is importantly different from certain non-moral cases.
For instance, not only might Vera have gained the concept 'bus' via ostension;; it seems the origin of that concept might have been ostensive, too.
Against Perceptual Knowledge of Moral Bridge Principles
In this section, I argue that if epistemically successful moral perception is mediated by knowledge of moral bridge principles, there can be no purely perceptual moral epistemology. Those seeking to offer a purely perceptual moral epistemology would have to offer a purely perceptual epistemology for those bridge principles. If moral perception is mediated, they cannot.
Suppose Sam knows that cat-torture is wrong. Here are three ways-arguably, the only three ways-he might know this:
(1) Sam knows the principle a priori.
(2) Sam knows the principle through perception.
(3) Sam infers the principle from background knowledge.
I will start by setting aside views on which moral bridge principles are analytic. This is not because I think such views are false but because, as discussed in §2.3, they may be able to vindicate unmediated moral perception, and thus needn't worry about my arguments in this section. On the other hand, the principle's being an instance of synthetic a priori knowledge is obviously incompatible with an attempt to develop a purely perceptual epistemology for it. So (1) provides no additional hope for those who would defend a purely perceptual moral epistemology.
Moving to (2): If perception of principles is even possible, it surely must be mediated. After all, principles are not the sorts of things that can directly explain our perceptions of them. What sort of background knowledge might mediate such perception? So far as I can see, the only candidate would be knowledge of the principle's relata. If this is to be purely perceptual, knowledge of the relata would have to be perceptual. In a moral bridge principle, though, one of the relata is a moral property. Since the possibility of purely perceptual knowledge of moral properties is precisely what is at issue, (2) serves only to move the bump in the rug.
This brings us to (3). In order for (3) to help the defender of a purely perceptual moral epistemology, the inference in question would have to be somehow grounded in perception. To see Faraci 21
how this might go, return to Cliff2's perception of H20. Cliff2 has an experience as of water. He also perceives H20-a perception mediated by his knowledge that water is H20. How does he know that water is H20? A while back, he collected some samples of water and looked at them under a highpowered microscope. He noticed that, in all cases, the samples had the molecular structure of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. Given this, plus further (we may presume perceptual) knowledge about molecular behavior, Cliff2 concluded that the best explanation for this consistent correlation is that water is H20. 36 We might thus conclude that, despite being mediated, Cliff2's knowledge is purely perceptual.
37
Suppose Sam claims that his knowledge that cat-torture is wrong works much the same way:
At some point in the past, he had multiple correlated perceptions of wrongness and of cat-torture (yikes!), and inferred that the best explanation for this is the truth of the principle that cat-torture is wrong. I accept, for the sake of argument, that this is a live possibility. Importantly, it still won't permit Sam to conclude that his knowledge here is purely perceptual.
To see why, recall that we are assuming that Sam's perceptions of wrongness are mediated by knowledge of moral bridge principles. Clearly, if he claims to know that cat-torture is wrong via abduction from correlated perceptions of wrongness and cat-torture, the relevant background knowledge can't be that cat-torture is wrong. His perceptions of wrongness must have been mediated by other knowledge-say, the bridge principle causing suffering is wrong as well as his knowledge that cat-torture causing suffering.
36 Drawing this conclusion about property identity might require further, non-empirical philosophical knowledge about the nature of property identity, but Cliff could make do with a weaker relation, such as consistent correlation. 37 One might wish to resist this conclusion. Perhaps Cliff2's abductive inference relies on something a priori, for instance. Since this would only serve to weaken the case for purely perceptual knowledge of moral bridge principles, I set it aside.
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We are now left to ask how Sam knows that causing suffering is wrong. Suppose that, again, he claims to have arrived at this principle via abduction from multiple correlated perceptions of wrongness and of suffering (it's been a bad year). If so, there must be some further bridge principle that mediated his perceptions of wrongness in those cases. And we must ask how Sam knows that principle. If we are to avoid an unhelpful regress, at some point Sam must gain the relevant knowledge in some other way.
38
Assuming these are indeed the only options, we may conclude that while there may be perceptual knowledge of some moral bridge principles, others-specifically, the fundamental onesmust be known non-perceptually. It follows that there can be no purely perceptual epistemology for moral bridge principles. If all moral perception is indeed mediated by knowledge of such principles, it further follows that there can be no purely perceptual moral epistemology.
Conclusion
The potential epistemological advantages of defending moral perception are highly seductive. Given the myriad explanatory challenges facing any metaethical view, it would be an incredible boon to be able to say that we know about the instantiation of moral properties in much the same way as we know that there is a bus passing in front of us. Unfortunately, even if we sometimes perceive moral properties, this alone isn't sufficient to grant that benefit. For moral perceptions may be mediated by background knowledge which is not itself perceptual. I have argued that unless some moral and non-moral experiences have the same phenomenal content, moral perception would have to be mediated. I further argued that if moral perception is mediated, knowledge of the mediating moral bridge principles could not itself be purely perceptual.
38 Compare Zangwill (2006) .
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Before concluding, I'll note two potential further implications of my arguments in this paper.
The first is rather obvious: My arguments might be taken to support moral rationalism. Looking back to §3, it seems that of the three options presented, all but (1) depend on background moral knowledge. This might indicate that knowledge of the fundamental moral principles must be a priori.
Second, my argument that epistemically successful moral perception must mediated by knowledge of moral bridge principles might be taken to have problematic implications for moral particularism. Whether this is the case will depend, for one, on whether the kinds of principles involved in mediation of moral perception are the same as those particularists reject.
Both issues are too complex to be addressed here. I mention them by way of sowing seeds to be cultivated elsewhere, as it were. Here, my conclusion is that, insofar as moral and non-moral experiences have different phenomenal content, moral knowledge cannot be purely perceptual.
